IOs range from simple entities like the APEC secretariat, with an initi $2 million, to formidable organizations like the European Union (EU)1 an Bank, which has thousands of employees and multiple affiliates and lend dollars each year. Specialized agencies like the ILO, ICAO, and FAO play in technical issue areas. New organizations like UNEP, the EBRD, and th tional Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia are regularly created. Older IO and the Security Council are rethought and sometimes restructured to circumstances.2 As the examples illustrate, moreover, even the most pow often act through IOs. In short, "it is impossible to imagine contemporary life" without formal organizations (Schermers and Blokker 1995, 3) .
Why do states so frequently use IOs as vehicles of cooperation? Wha account for their use, and how do these characteristics set formal organi from alternative arrangements, such as decentralized cooperation, inform tion, and treaty rules? Surprisingly, contemporary international scholar clear theoretical answers to such questions and thus offers limited practi policy makers.
We answer these questions by identifying the functional attributes of range of issue areas. Although we are concerned with the concrete str operations of particular organizations, we also see IOs as complex phen implicate several lines of international relations (IR) theory. From this v we identify two functional characteristics that lead states, in appropr stances, to prefer IOs to alternate forms of institutionalization. These are c and independence.
IOs allow for the centralization of collective activities through a concrete organizational structure and a supportive administrative apparatus. These efficiency of collective activities and enhance the organization's ability to affect the understandings, environment, and interests of states. Independence means the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstate disputes and conflicts. IO independence is highly constrained: member states, especially the powerful, can limit the autonomy of IOs, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them. But as in many private transactions, participation by even a partially autonomous, neutral actor can increase efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective actions. This provides even powerful states with incentives to grant IOs substantial independence.
The broad categories of centralization and independence encompass numerous specific functions. Most IOs perform more than one, though each has its own unique combination. We do not enumerate every such function or provide a comprehensive typology. Instead, we highlight several of the most important. We focus especially on the active functions of IOs-facilitating the negotiation and implementation of agreements, resolving disputes, managing conflicts, carrying out operational activities like technical assistance, elaborating norms, shaping international discourse, and the like-that IR theory has only sparingly addressed. Rational states will use or create a formal IO when the value of these functions outweighs the costs, notably the resulting limits on unilateral action.
Distinguishing formal IOs from alternative forms of organization is important from several perspectives. For IR scholars, who largely abandoned the study of formal IOs in the move from the legal-descriptive tradition to more theoretical approaches, developing such distinctions should "open up a large and important research agenda" with institutional form and structure as central dependent variables (Young 1994, 4;  see also Koremenos et al. 1997 ). This will complement emerging work on international legalization, a closely related form of institutionalization (Burley and Mattli 1993; Abbott and Snidal 1997; Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 1997) . Such research will also benefit practitioners of conflict management and regime design (Mitchell 1994) . The policy implications of our analysis are significant as well. Many states, notably the United States, now resist the creation of IOs and hesitate to support those already in operation, citing the shortcomings of international bureaucracy, the costs of formal organization, and the irritations of IO autonomy. This is an ideal time for students of international governance to focus on the other side of the ledger.
The next section spells out our theoretical approach, drawing lessons from the ways in which different schools of theory have dealt with (or have failed to deal with) the questions posed above. It is followed by an analysis of the organizational attributes of centralization and independence and the functions they make possible-especially in contexts of cooperation and nonviolent conflict. The final section explores two composite functions that challenge conventional views of 10 capabilities and demonstrate the complementarity of prevailing theories: developing, expressing, and carrying out community norms and aspirations and enforcing rules and commitments. We conclude with the example of the Security Council in the Gulf War, which draws together these themes in the context of violent conflict.
PUTTING IOs INTO THEORY AND THEORY INTO IOs
Our primary approach is rationalist and institutionalist. We assume, for s that states are the principal actors in world politics and that they use IOs to cr orderings appropriate to their pursuit of shared goals: producing collecti collaborating in prisoner's dilemma settings, solving coordination problem like. We start with the pursuit of efficiency and employ the logic of transact economics and rational choice (Snidal 1996) , using analogies with business f medieval trading institutions. Decentralized cooperation theory and, espe gime theory provide a strong deductive basis for this analysis.
Regime theory (Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984) represents a major ad understanding international cooperation. It is self-consciously theoretical an directly on the institutional organization of international cooperation. But it h shortcomings. Most important, regime scholars embrace an earlier turn in unnecessarily coupled a move to theory with a move away from considerat themselves. This resulted in "the steady disengagement of international or scholars from the study of organizations, to the point that today one mus whether such a field even exists any longer except in name only" (Roche 783-84). Indeed, regime theory deals with institutions at such a general lev has little to say about the particular institutional arrangements that organiz tional politics. Our focus on the concrete operations of formal IOs not only br into regime theory but also provides a broader opportunity for IR theory to di among institutional forms and recapture institutional details. We draw on descriptive literature to accomplish this. Furthermore, regime theory has been rightly criticized for paying insu attention to issues of power and distribution in international politics. We draw considerations to supplement our institutionalist approach in this regard although regime theory has paid increasing attention to the role of ideas and international politics (Goldstein and Keohane 1993) , it has only begun to in these important considerations. Here, we draw on constructivist theory for In sum, we enrich our primarily rationalist approach with important insig several different traditions, which we see as complementary rather than co Decentralized cooperation theory takes as the problematic of internation nance the existence of coordination and collaboration problems requiring action (Oye 1986; Stein 1983; Snidal 1985a) . It assumes anarchy, often dep game models, and analyzes how states cooperate in that spare contex strategies of reciprocity and other forms of self-help. The dependent va typically cooperation in the abstract, and much of the research in this traditio directed to disproving the realist assertion that cooperation in anarchy is There is no nuanced account of the forms of cooperation because the anarchy assumption makes IOs and other institutions largely irrelevant. However, the strong assumptions that underlie the theory, such as the need for high-quality information, suggest that cooperation is unlikely without an adequate institutional contextalthough the theory is only beginning to analyze that context (Morrow 1994) . For our Abbott, Snidal / FORMAL INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 7 purposes, however, it performs a useful service by emphasizing that institutional capacities other than centralized enforcement are crucial in mediating interstate relations.
Regime theory, in contrast, deals explicitly with institutional factors affecting cooperation, and regime scholars frequently mention IOs. But they downplay the distinctive institutional role(s) of IOs, perhaps in continued reaction against the earlier preoccupation with formal organizations. For example, Martin (1992) depicts the European Economic Community (EEC) and the Coordinating Committee for Export Controls (COCOM) as important but nevertheless quite rudimentary forums for intergovernmental bargaining; Weber (1994) emphasizes the broad political and symbolic goals of the EBRD. Neither discusses the organizations' primary operational roles. Keohane's (1984) After Hegemony also emphasizes intergovernmental bargaining, arguing that regimes help states reach specific agreements by reducing transaction costs, improving information, and raising the costs of violations. But this valuable analysis also excludes many significant operational activities of IOs.3 In all these works, furthermore, regime scholars treat international institutions as passive. Regimes are seen, for example, as embodying norms and rules or clarifying expectations (Keohane 1984; Yarbrough and Yarbrough 1992; Garrett and Weingast 1993) , functions also performed by treaties and informal agreements. Regimes are also seen as forums in which states can interact more efficiently: like Keohane and Martin, Moravcsik's (1991) analysis of the Single European Act treats IOs as sites of, but not as agents in, cooperation. Indeed, the canonical definition of regime (Krasner 1983) encompasses only norms and collective choice procedures, making no provision for the active and independent IO functions-and the corresponding institutional formsthat we emphasize below.
Legal scholarship continues to offer descriptive accounts of the history and institutional architecture of IOs, as well as doctrinal analysis of norms and texts, especially the normative output of organizations such as ILO treaties or General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)/WTO panel decisions (Bowett 1982; Kirgis 1993) . More important for present purposes, another strand of doctrinal theory addresses the constitutional law of IOs, including membership and voting rules, external relations, finance, and the authority of specific organs (Amerasinghe 1994; Sohn 1950 Sohn , 1967 Dupuy 1988; Shihata 1991 Shihata , 1995 . The best of this work is comparative, examining how common problems of organization and operation are addressed in the constitutive documents and practices of various IOs (Schermers and Blokker 1995; Chayes and Chayes 1995) . Unfortunately, "in the land of legal science, there is no strongly established tradition of developing theories on IOs" (Schermers and Blokker 1995, 8 ; see also Brownlie 1990, 679) . Nevertheless, legal scholarshiplike some earlier work in IR, notably Cox and Jacobson (1973) -carefully differentiates among institutional forms and emphasizes institutional details, an important contribution that we use in our analysis.
Realist theory finds both legal and regime scholarship naive in treat serious political entities. Realists believe states would never cede to sup institutions the strong enforcement capacities necessary to overcome in anarchy. Consequently, IOs and similar institutions are of little interest; reflect national interests and power and do not constrain powerful states (M 1995; Strange 1983 ; for a more nuanced view, see Glaser 1995) . We accep point that states are jealous of their power and deeply concerned with th consequences of their interactions. Yet, realists underestimate the utility to the powerful. The United States, at the peak of its hegemony, sponsor IOs, including GATT, IMF, and NATO; these organizations have provided utility . . . as instruments ... for regime and rule creation" (Karns and M 29). Even the Soviet Union, the very model of a modern repressive hege the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance to organize economic relat the eastern bloc. We argue that powerful states structure such organization their own interests but must do so in a way that induces weaker states t This interplay is embedded in 10 structure and operations.
Finally, Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986) argue that only constructivist (in theory-focusing on norms, beliefs, knowledge, and understandings-can rily explain formal organizations. We accept the insight that social cons fundamental elements of international politics (Wendt 1992 (Wendt , 1995  Barne agree that IOs are-in part-both reflections of and participants in ongo processes and prevailing ideas (Finnemore 1996; Kennedy 1987) . But the is best understood through a synthesis of rationalist (including realist) a tivist approaches. States consciously use IOs both to reduce transaction narrow sense and, more broadly, to create information, ideas, norms, and e to carry out and encourage specific activities; to legitimate or delegitima ideas and practices; and to enhance their capacities and power. The constitute IOs as agents, which, in turn, influence the interests, intersubje standings, and environment of states (McNeely 1995) . Potentially, these r an influence well beyond their material power, which is trivial on con measures. Indeed, IO activities may lead to unintended consequences fo states, a fear often expressed by U.S. politicians. Yet, IO autonomy rem constrained by state interests, especially those of the powerful-a fact o strated by U.S. politicians.
Although we adopt a predominantly rationalist theoretical approach, w cerned with highlighting the importance of formal IOs as empirical phen than with maintaining a particular theoretical dogma. None of the ind proaches mentioned adequately explains why states use formal IOs; eac insights. In identifying formal IOs as an important category of institutio be explained, therefore, we proceed in a more interpretive mode, drawing o strands of argumentation to highlight ways in which formal IOs functio interstate cooperation and conflict.4 4. On the use of rational choice as an interpretive device, see Ferejohn (1991) , John Snidal (1985b) .
THE FUNCTIONS OF IOs:

CENTRALIZATION AND INDEPENDENCE
Two characteristics distinguish IOs from other international institut zation (a concrete and stable organizational structure and an administra managing collective activities) and independence (the authority to act of autonomy, and often with neutrality, in defined spheres).5 The very centralized secretariat implies some operational autonomy, but this is o administrative and technical matters and subject to close supervision by In other situations-sometimes involving the same organizations-subs omy and neutrality are essential. The range and potential importance of t lead us to treat independence as a separate category.
Centralization and independence enhance efficiency. An analogy to ness firms is instructive. The firm replaces contractual relations am workers, and managers; it substitutes a centralized, hierarchical organ horizontal, negotiated relations of contract. In Coase's (1937) theory, fir when the transaction costs of direct contracting are too high for effic
Similarly, the move from decentralized cooperation to IOs occurs whe direct state interaction outweigh the costs of international organiza consequent constraints on unilateral action (Trachtman 1996) .
Centralization and independence represent different forms of tra economizing. Small businesses draw mainly on the centralization benef organization, interposing a legal entity with the ability to manage emp chically and the capacity to contract, sue, and be sued. The owners sti business directly, though their interactions are more highly structure larger firms additionally benefit by granting autonomy and supervisor professional managers; in Berle and Means's (1968, 5) famous phr "separation of ownership and control." The situation is similar in co which member states grant some authority to IO organs and personne them through structures resembling the corporate shareholders me directors, and executive committee. Introducing these new actor relations among states and allows them to achieve goals unattainable in setting.
Centralization and independence produce political effects beyond mere efficiency. In these respects, IOs resemble governments and private associations more than business firms. Independence, in particular, enables IOs to shape understandings, influence the terms of state interactions, elaborate norms, and mediate or resolve member states' disputes. The acts of independent IOs may be accorded special legitimacy, and they affect the legitimacy of members' actions. Even centralization, seemingly more mechanical, can alter states' perceptions and the context of their interactions.
5. Centralization and independence are matters of degree, not only among IOs but even between IOs and related institutions. For example, the Group of Seven is not a formal IO but merely a negotiating forum. Its organizational practices (e.g., a rotating chair) nevertheless provide some centralization benefits, and it partakes of some autonomy, as in legitimating members' actions.
CENTRALIZATION
It is no great theoretical insight that an established organizational centralized administrative support can render collective activities more students of international governance are not content to communicate form the International Studies Association and the International Law Association. This simple insight goes far to explain the proliferation of IOs in this century in a period of increasing issue complexity and a growing number of states. The (inter)subjective effects of centralization are less apparent, though equally important. We consider the benefits of centralization under two headings-support for direct state interaction (the principal focus of regime theory) and operational activities (the traditional focus of IO studies). Here, we emphasize concrete activities in which governments remain closely involved; the following section introduces broader functions also requiring IO autonomy.
SUPPORT FOR STATE INTERACTIONS
The organizational structure of IOs enhances even the passive virtues rec by regime theory. An established organization provides a stable negotiating enhancing iteration and reputational effects. Such a stable forum also allows response to sudden developments. The Security Council, for example, is org that it can function on short notice, with each member required to maintain c representation at UN headquarters. A permanent organization also reinforce norms: the most favored nation (MFN) principle instantiated in the WTO p sounder basis for state expectations than any informal arrangement.
In other ways too, centralization shapes the political context of state inte IOs provide neutral, depoliticized, or specialized forums more effectively th any informal or decentralized arrangement. This enables a broader range of the superpowers could discuss technical nuclear issues within the IAEA wit intrusion of high politics, even at the height of the cold war. IOs also serve as forums for political coalitions: the United Nations Conference on Trade an ment (UNCTAD) for developing countries, the Organization for Economic tion and Development (OECD) for industrialized states. Finally, IOs strength linkages by situating them within common organizational structures, as the done for goods, services, and intellectual property rights.
Formal organizations further embody the precise terms of state interaction sentation and voting rules "constitutionalize" balances among states having levels of power, interest, or knowledge. States with advanced nuclear techn large supplies of nuclear raw material are guaranteed seats on the IAEA B Governors; states with major shipping and carrier interests have equal repr on the International Maritime Organization (IMO) Council. Such decision s frequently guarantee disproportionate influence for powerful states. Yet, they constitutionalize protection for weaker states and hold the powerful accou fixed rules and procedures. For example, both the Security Council and the are structured so that the most powerful members can block affirmative actions but even if united, cannot approve actions without support from smaller powers.
Such considerations often lead to elaborate organizational structures. The substantive work of many IOs takes place in specialized committees staffed by their secretariats. The OECD uses more than 200 committees and working groups; the IMO prepares treaties in substantive groupings like the maritime safety and marine environmental protection committees. Such committees are often formally open to all members, bu specialization occurs naturally because of differences in interest, expertise, and resources. Delegation can also be encouraged institutionally: in the third UN law of the sea conference (UNCLOS III), the chairs of open-ended committees sometimes scheduled meetings in rooms capable of holding only 30 people!6 Organizational structure influences the evolution of interstate cooperation as conditions change. For example, several environmental agreements were facilitated by appointing UNEP as secretariat and the World Bank as financial administrator, obviating the need for new institutions. These institutional links are often contested because of their distributional implications. The advanced countries fought to locate new intellectual property rules in the WTO (rather than in the World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO]) so they could enforce their rights more effectively. In other cases, organizational structures create vested interests that impede change or politicize issues, as in the United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) during the 1970s. More generally, because IOs are designed for stability, they may not adapt smoothly to changing power conditions, as the continuing makeup of the Security Council attests. Yet, the gradual reduction of U.S. voting power in the IMF, mandated by its declining share of capital contributions, illustrates how organizational structure can facilitate such adaptation.
Most IOs include a secretariat or similar administrative apparatus. In simple consultative organizations, the secretariat need only assist with the mechanics of decentralized interaction. The 1985 Vienna Ozone Convention assigned the following functions to its secretariat: "(a) To arrange for and service meetings...; (b) To prepare and transmit reports based upon information received ... ; (d) To prepare reports on its activities .. .; (e) To ensure the necessary coordination with other relevant international bodies . . .; (f) To perform such other functions as may be determined" ("Vienna Convention" 1985 , 1532 . The secretariat for the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP) performed similar functions with only five professionals. Levy (1993, 84) notes that the staff had "little time to do anything else but keep the meetings running smoothly."
Even such modest activities can strengthen international cooperation. Here, we draw on the analogy to the medieval law merchant and the corresponding theoretical literature (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990; Calvert 1995; Morrow 1994) . Informal consultations produced sufficient information on the identity of untrustworthy traders to support a substantial volume of trade. Yet, modest efforts by central administrators at commercial fairs to collect and relay additional information created a new equilibrium at a higher level of exchange.
Most IOs perform more extensive supportive functions. Law-making like UNCLOS III or the Rio conference on the environment and develo heavily on their secretariats. IO personnel coordinate and structure age background research, and promote successful negotiations. They keep tr ments on particular issues, trade-offs, and areas of disagreement, period ing texts that consolidate the current state of play. They also transmit pr assurances, improving the flow of information.
IO staffs support decentralized cooperation between major conferenc expert OECD secretariat collects, produces, and publishes information national economic policy coordination. The WTO secretariat assists in negotiations, from the settlement of disputes to sectoral talks under agreement. IO staffs also support the decentralized implementation of secretariat for the Basel convention on the transboundary movement wastes, provides information states need to manage activities under the tr receives, summarizes, and circulates national reports on treaty impleme Experience under the international trade regime testifies to the im organizational structure and administrative support. The original GATT tive and consultative arrangement; almost all organizational features we the instance of the United States. Yet, member states soon needed mo organizational structure and support. As membership expanded and co issues appeared on the agenda, GATT began its metamorphosis int true 10.
MANAGING SUBSTANTIVE OPERATIONS
IOs do more than support intergovernmental negotiations; they manage of operational activities. A prototypical operational organization is the Wor which finances massive development projects, borrows on world capital m reviews state investment proposals, provides technical assistance and train many disciplines, generates extensive research and publications, and p other substantive activities. Operational organizations normally have sizable and bureaucracies, complex organizational structures, and substantial oper autonomy.7
Member states of an 10 like the World Bank use the institution as an agent, taking advantage of its centralized organization and staff to carry out collective activities. The analogy of the large business corporation, with its dispersed owner-investors and professional managers, is apt. Compared with a decentralized approach based on ad hoc contracting, a formal organization provides efficiency gains that outweigh the accompanying costs in terms of money, human resources, and constraints on unilateral action. Especially when participating states differ in power, centralized operations will have significant distributional consequences. 7. We reserve for the following section discussion of those functions that turn directly on independence and neutrality. IO operations also significantly influence the capabilities, understandings, and interests of states. This is most apparent with outputs such as information and rules But it is also true of more material activities like technical assistance and join production. Indeed, virtually all of the activities discussed below promote certain norms and practices among states, often in unanticipated ways.
Pooling
Many IOs are vehicles for pooling activities, assets, or risks. Some pooling can be accomplished on a decentralized basis, as in a business partnership, but a separate entity with a stable organizational structure and specialized staff can greatly reduce transaction costs while providing additional advantages.
Consider the World Bank again. As in other international financial institutions (IFIs), members pool financial resources through capital contributions and commitments. Pooling provides a solid cushion of capital that enables the World Bank to make credible financial commitments to borrowers, who rely on them for costly planning and investment decisions, and to world capital markets, in which the bank borrows at advantageous rates. In addition, this common effort promotes burden sharing in providing a collective good and may limit the competition for influence that characterizes some bilateral assistance. Similarly, by combining development loans in a common portfolio, bank members pool, and thereby reduce, their individual risk.
Pooling enables the World Bank to achieve economies of scale by carrying out a large volume of activities, establishing uniform procedures and building up a common body of data. These economies allow it to develop greater technical expertise on various aspects of country and project assessment than could most states and to innovate in emerging areas like "basic needs." Finally, the bank's broad jurisdiction creates a horizontal advantage akin to economies of scope: by dealing with virtually all needy countries, the bank can target global priorities while avoiding duplication and gaps in coverage.8
The largest states, especially the United States, could mobilize sufficient capital to accomplish their international financial objectives unilaterally.9 They are unwilling to do so, however, for international and domestic political reasons and because of competing priorities. Indeed, the United States is actively working to strengthen the IFIs, in part because their broad membership and assessment structures encourage wide cost sharing.10 In the meantime, although the G-7 countries bear most of the costs of the IFIs, they also retain the greatest share of voting power and influence on management. During the cold war, they successfully excluded the Soviet bloc and the People's Republic of China. Yet, the United States has been unable consistently to dictate IFI decisions on specific transactions.
8. Of course, as Kratochwil (1996) notes, large-scale centralized operations may not be necessary or desirable in all cases. The Maastricht Treaty's subsidiarity principle adopts this view, while authorizing supranational activity when the scale of the problem makes that appropriate. 9. The desire to benefit from pooling is nevertheless reflected in U.S. Treasury Secretary Rubin's lament that the "United States cannot be the lender of last resort to the world" (quoted in Sanger 1995) .
10. The G-7 countries also benefit from IFI independence, as discussed below.
Nonfinancial IOs provide similar advantages. The public health activit like other UN-specialized agencies, are based on the pooling of national and cost sharing (though the industrialized countries bear the bulk of economies of scale provide operational efficiencies. The WHO smallpox illustrates the horizontal benefits of centralization: a single global camp contagious disease is more effective than decentralized efforts becaus avoids gaps in coverage. (The IAEA nuclear safeguards system off advantage.) In addition, the stable organizational structure of WHO and tion-staking effect of membership encourage participation. Free-rider main, but the organization can alleviate them by using its own resourc provides effective technical assistance by pooling financial and techni and accumulating expertise; its global scope diffuses new technologies rational prioritization of needs. By enhancing the development and tra ideas, technical activities of specialized organizations have significantl interests and identities of states. At the same time, they have helped l states acquire capacities essential to both national policy making and i activity.
An example of the limits of pooling illustrates these effects and the importance of realist and constructivist considerations. UNESCO's scientific arm was intended to promote the public goods aspects of scientific research by pooling international scientific facilities and creating a central clearinghouse. The organization was initially oriented toward the needs of scientists: executive board members did not represent governments. With the cold war, however, state interests asserted themselves. The board was reorganized to represent states, and UNESCO's orientation shifted to national science. Finnemore (1996) documents how UNESCO technical assistance subsequently promoted national science programs even in states where there was little need for them. Thus, UNESCO helped shape states' identities, interests, and capabilities in the area of science policy even though its initial global objectives were frustrated by interstate rivalries. Alchian and Demsetz's (1972) theory of the firm suggests that a centralized organization is particularly important when workers, managers, and other "inputs" must work in teams, producing a joint output. In these situations, the hierarchical organization of the firm makes it easier for managers, themselves beholden to the owners ("residual claimants"), to monitor, reward, and discipline employees. 10 personnel engage in similar teamwork and thus are typically organized hierarchically, with supervision by and on behalf of member states.
Joint Production
Beyond this, states themselves sometimes form multinational "teams" to engage in production activities. Experts from several European states cooperate in subatomic research through the European Organization for Nuclear Research (CERN), an IO that operates a nuclear laboratory; the Airbus project is a similar example. In addition to holding participants responsible, these organizations pool resources and risks, achieve economies of scale, avoid duplication and unproductive competition, and ensure that the outputs, including technological externalities, are shared. Projects like CERN and Airbus resemble business firms even more than the typical 10. Indeed, Airbus, originally created as a partnership under French law, is being transformed into a private corporation to better coordinate the participants.
Perhaps the best example of interstate joint production is the NATO military alliance. Common war plans, specialization of military tasks, joint exercises, common equipment and interchangeable parts, and, of course, the conduct of battle are examples of teamwork par excellence. NATO's integrated command-operating hierarchically on behalf of member states as residual claimants-organizes, monitors, and disciplines participants in the joint activities of the alliance, probably the most successful in history.1'
Norm Elaboration and Coordination
States arrange cooperative relationships through agreements. As Williamson (19 1994) and others have pointed out, bounded rationality and high transaction an information costs make it difficult for states-like the parties to any contractanticipate and provide for all possible contingencies. The longer and more comp the relationship, the more significant the contingencies; the greater the investment specific assets, the greater the uncertainty and risk of opportunism. The domestic le system helps alleviate these problems by supplying missing terms and decision ru but the international institutional context is comparatively thin. "First, in internati law, there is not a very complete body of law that can be applied to supply miss terms.... Second, ... there is generally no dispute resolution tribunal with mandat jurisdiction. . . . The alternative, of course, is to write comprehensive contract (Trachtman 1996, 51-54) .
There is another alternative: to create procedures for the elaboration of norms wit an 1O. Decentralized procedures do not address the problems of transaction costs opportunism. Even with coordination issues-in which equilibria can sometimes reached without communication-these problems can stymie cooperation when th are many actors, complex problems, and distributive conflicts. The stable organi tional structure of IOs addresses both issues. Established procedures for elaborati rules, standards, and specifications enhance cooperation even when member sta retain the power to reject or opt out-as they do even in 1Os with relatively advan legislative procedures, like the ILO. Nonbinding recommendations can become d facto coordination equilibria, relied on by states and other international actors. T gives IOs some power to affect international norms and state behavior and potent much greater power with the backing of key states.
As always, powerful states exert disproportionate influence over norm elaborat and structure legislative processes to ensure their influence. Here, too, howeve protection for weaker states may be the price of their participation, and the effecti 11. The analogy is imperfect. NATO's organization differs from that of a firm. Nevertheless, tea analysis suggests why a formal 10 is valuable, whereas the standard public goods analogy reduce problem simply to one of individual (under)provision. See Olson and Zeckhauser (1966). ness of an established rule-making procedure requires that powerful st those arrangements. For example, powerful states often limit IO jurisd technical areas with limited distributional impact; as a result, IO legislativ may go forward-up to a point, at least-less influenced by narrow nation and differential power than direct intergovernmental bargaining.
Many IOs engage in norm elaboration, especially of a technical kind. Th notably, has issued a huge number of directives, regulations, and other acts-affecting everything from franchise agreements to telecommunicati nectivity standards to tax policy-though many important issues have be through interstate agreements and mutual recognition. The preparation legislation is housed exclusively in the commission to facilitate a depol expert approach.
Many other IOs carry out extensive legislative programs, frequently f coordination rules. The ICAO promulgates international "rules of the air national Telecommunications Union (ITU) coordinates national broadcast ards; the Customs Cooperation Council implements common customs ru Codex Alimentarius Commission harmonizes food standards. Although these standards have important effects on (and within) states, as the c privileging Codex standards under the North American Free Trade (NAFTA) demonstrated. Although the associated IOs are quite weak, the is strengthened by the self-enforcing nature of coordination equilibria.
INDEPENDENCE
Although centralization often requires some operational autonomy, 1O functions require more substantive independence. The participation independent, neutral actor can transform relations among states, enha ciency and legitimacy of collective and individual actions. These funct delicate balance among short-and long-term collective and distributio Powerful states will not enter an organization they cannot influence, yet the independence of an organization performing the functions discu simultaneously reduce its effectiveness and their own ability to achie Analogies from the business firm and the law merchant illustrate Shareholders in a large corporation must monitor managers to limit ag if major shareholders cause managers to favor their interests unduly, ot to invest. If shareholders generally assert excessive control, moreover advantages of professional management. The law merchant analogy is Powerful princes granted monopoly privileges to independent guild merchants, enabling them to embargo the princes themselves if they of the merchants (Grief, Milgrom, and Weingast 1994) . By eliminat incentives to cheat, these arrangements enabled them to make the bin ments necessary to induce mutually beneficial trade. The princes could guilds' privileges, of course, but were constrained from doing so by th of trade.
This content downloaded from 64.28.140.228 on Thu, 24 Jan 2019 14:12:05 UTC All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms Independent IOs promote intergovernmental cooperation in more proact than those discussed earlier; they are initiating as well as supportive org The governing body is often authorized to call together member states t current problems. IO personnel also influence negotiation agendas. On a hig plane, UNEP kept ozone protection alive when interstate negotiations dead built support for the Montreal Protocol. The UN secretary-general may put Security Council any matter that, in his opinion, threatens international security. At the administrative level, the ILO governing body sets the Genera ence agenda with assistance from the International Labor Office. At the techn IO and conference officials advance specific proposals and suggest li trade-offs: the president of UNCLOS III was authorized to defer contentio forge a consensus during deferment; the negotiating text advanced by GAT General Dunkel during the Uruguay Round catalyzed the faltering negotia helped bridge substantive differences.
IO officials are also prominent members of the epistemic communities th and transmit new ideas for international governance (Haas 1992) . Drake and (1992, 76) document the role of IOs in developing the concepts behind the tion of trade in services: a "comparatively small number of experts in the G on Negotiation in Services] and on the GATT, UNCTAD and OECD staffs main source of the specific kinds of new ideas needed to carry the policy p conclusion." The UN Economic Commission on Latin America is well known as the source of many ideas regarding economic development that rallied the Group of 77. Such autonomous efforts can modify the political, normative, and intellectual context of interstate interactions. These factors are not purely exogenous, as in structural theories or constructivist approaches that locate them in general societal trends, but are tied to the agency and interests of IOs (Ness and Brechin 1988; Scott 1992) .
Independence is equally important in implementation. The ILO committee of experts-a group of private individuals-comments on national reports. Some ILO organs use these comments to highlight noncompliance with ILO conventions and recommendations and to invite governments to submit additional information. Other IOs report on state compliance in addition to, or in lieu of, national reports. IO officials further monitor state conduct, in more or less intrusive ways, although enforcement remains decentralized. For example, the WTO regularly reviews the general effects of national trade policies.
MANAGING SUBSTANTIVE OPERATIONS
In the above examples, IOs facilitate interstate collaboration by pushin tions forward. This role could be played by, say, a dominant state, but su bias might impede cooperation; an independent 10 may be more accepta it is neutral. For many substantive IO operations, however, it is the existenc independent third party, not the absence of bias per se, that enables state their ends.
Laundering
Laundering has a negative connotation from its association with runnin gains through seemingly independent financial institutions until they com having lost their original character and taint. Without necessarily adop connotation, we use the term advisedly because the process at work in IO activities that might be unacceptable in their original state-to-state fo acceptable when run through an independent, or seemingly independen concept should be familiar to IR scholars who are reluctant to accept Cen gence Agency funds but eagerly accept National Science Foundation gran by independent academic panels.
Appropriately enough, the World Bank, IMF, and other IFIs provide cle States may prefer development assistance from an independent financia over direct aid from another state, especially a former colonial power or political influence. IFI restrictions on national autonomy (e.g., on proje broader economic policies) may not carry the same domestic political im dependence and inferiority as would conditions imposed directly by, say States or France. These considerations may make IFI conditions a superio promoting domestic reforms.
IFIs equally serve a laundering function for donor states seeking to avo and international controversies. The World Bank's charter requires, for e development loans be made without regard for the "political character" of t disregard of this factor is difficult within the United States, where financi budgets require congressional approval. The United States called on manage the 1980s debt crisis, keeping the issue less politicized and mor Similarly, the Soviet Union laundered subsidies to subordinate states in Ea through Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA) trading practic domestic opposition to these political and economic arrangements both a in recipient states (Marreese 1986 ). IFIs also inhibit domestic special int distorting policy for other purposes, as in the case of tied aid.
Although the obligation to participate in IFIs may be strong, doing so states curtail aid recipients' expectations, thus preserving flexibility. Alth national intermediaries diminish a donor state's leverage over recipient factor is offset by decreases in other states' leverage and in competition among donors. Donor states as a group, of course, retain control over the is the fund, not the United States or Germany, that imposes austerity on b
The autonomy needed for successful laundering gives IOs influen substance of their activities. For example, IFI staff have significant input criteria and adjustment policies and, increasingly, into social, environmenta related policies. Robert McNamara was able to broaden developmen beyond economic growth to include social factors and to reorient World (Finnemore 1996; Sanford 1988) . The point should not be overstated. M reforms were hardly radical, and Western countries were largely recep sequently, the Reagan administration pushed the World Bank partially b market policies. Thus, IO autonomy remains bounded by state interests and power, as reflected in institutional arrangements.
Such interventions can cause IOs to be perceived as politicized, responding to the interests of certain states or to issues beyond their regular purview. This occurred in the 1960s and 1970s, when the World Bank withheld loans from states that expropriated foreign property without compensation (Lipson 1985, 138-39) ; recently, the United States linked support for World Bank lending to human rights in cases, including China and Malawi (Kirgis 1993, 572-75) . Whatever their justification, such measures reflect a partial failure we label dirty laundering. Powerful states face a tension between the immediate advantages of dirty laundering versus the long-run costs of jeopardizing IO independence.
Laundering is not limited to financial organizations. UN peacekeeping allows powerful states to support conflict reduction without being drawn into regional conflicts and discourages other powers from taking advantage of their inaction. This simultaneously reassures small countries that the conflict will not be enlarged. The IAEA performs two different laundering functions. First, recipients may prefer technical assistance from an independent agency rather than a particular nuclear state, even though nuclear states as a group dominate the agency. Direct assistance may create dependence, reduce policy flexibility, and be domestically controversial. IAEA technical assistance programs also distance provider states from recipient nuclear programs and inhibit the commercial rivalry among suppliers that otherwise facilitates proliferation. Second, states subject to nuclear safeguards may be more willing to admit independent international monitors into sensitive nuclear facilities than to permit entry by representatives of another state. Interestingly, when the United States transferred bilateral safeguard responsibilities to the IAEA in 1962, some recipients resisted the new arrangement, fearing that nationals of various states on the IAEA staff would conduct covert intelligence missions. This suggests, however, not that the logic of laundering is false but that it turns on the perceived independence of the organization.
Laundering thus has significant implications for the constitutive rules of IOs. Although member states retain ultimate control, organizations must be structuredfrom their organs of governance down to their personnel policies-to create sufficient independence for laundering to succeed. A failing of the UN secretariat is that its personnel are viewed as retaining their national identities; by contrast, the "Eurocrat" is seen as having loyalties beyond his or her individual state.
Neutrality
Neutrality adds impartiality to independence. It enables IOs to mediate among states in contested interactions, including disputes and allocation decisions. UN neutrality underlies most of the functions discussed in the secretary-general's Agenda for Peace, from fact-finding and other forms of preventive diplomacy through dispute resolution and peacekeeping to postconflict consolidation of peace. Even more than laundering, neutrality demands that institutions be buffered from direct pressures of states.
IO as neutral information provider. Regime theory recognizes the impor information but does not emphasize differences in its quality. Information verified by an independent, neutral IO is more reliable than that provided because it is free of national biases. Consider the air pollution monitorin established in Europe under LRTAP. Data supplied by Sweden or Russi perceived as biased, but a neutral source of information was more credible support greater cooperation. The convention protecting Antarctic seals inc an existing institution, the Scientific Commission on Antarctic Research, as source and verifier of information on the status of seals and state activities. Ba this information, the parties attained a rather high degree of cooperatio conventions without neutral sources of information, such as that concerning A marine living resources, have been less successful. Finally, the 1991 General declaration on fact finding strengthens the UN secretary-general's role as information source in politically charged situations; the General Assembly larly encouraged the secretary-general to develop early-warning systems fo tional disputes and humanitarian crises.
International monitoring organizations, notably those operating under mu arms control treaties, provide outstanding examples of neutral information pr From the perspective of many participants, the neutrality of these organizatio most important feature. Impartial information not only deters cheating by ot also helps states assure others of their own compliance (Abbott 1993) . Alth literature on informal cooperation and the U.S.-Soviet arms control experien that states can perform these functions on their own (Glaser 1995) , the widesp of IOs testifies to the advantages of third-party neutrals.
IO as trustee. In private commercial dealings, neutral parties often hol belonging to persons who cannot be trusted with possession until a trans completed. The escrow agent, for example, protects assets until all element transaction are ready for closing, while the trustee holds assets on behalf who cannot take title immediately. Such arrangements are not common in IR, but notable examples exist. The Council held Iraq responsible for losses caused by its invasion of Kuwait. It Iraq to contribute a percentage of its oil export revenues to a UN compensa from which payments would be made. A compensation commission (whose g council includes representatives of Security Council members) administers as trustee for claimants. Subsequently, concerned about humanitarian need the council authorized states to import limited amounts of Iraqi oil with pa be made directly into a special escrow account for purchases of food and Similarly, an international oil pollution compensation fund is part of the IM governing oil spills in territorial waters.
Building on the League of Nations mandate system, the UN charter esta international trusteeship system. Individual states were typically designated as for various territories, with mixed results. But the charter did establish stand trustees and a trusteeship council to monitor them. It even contemplated th itself would perform the trustee function directly, an extraordinary example of the IO as a neutral party.
Traditional UN peacekeeping also illustrates the trustee function: UN forces patrol or even control territory to separate combatants, prevent conflict, and supervise negotiated cease-fires. UN neutrality also allows major powers to support peacekeeping without choosing sides among friendly states, as in Cyprus. Blue-helmet neutrality is crucial and guaranteed in multiple ways: operations are voluntary and require continuing consent of all parties, peacekeepers are from countries with no stake in the conflict and under UN command, operations are financed through general assessments, and troops are unarmed (observers) or lightly armed for self-defense to prevent uses of force inconsistent with neutrality. But these restrictions can limit the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations in some conflictual environments-as has been evident in Bosnia. To deal with these limitations, the secretary-general's Agenda for Peace proposes a preventive trustee function: UN-administered demilitarized zones, established in advance of actual conflict to separate contending parties and remove any pretext for attack.
Neutral activities must be keenly attuned to the realities of international power.
U Thant's quick withdrawal of the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF) at
Egypt's request in 1967 was based on the legal principle requiring consent for UN operations but equally reflected the reality that two contributing countries had threatened to withdraw troops if Egyptian wishes were not respected. Nevertheless, like an escrow agent, peacekeeping is effective when it furthers state interests in limiting conflict.
The Acheson-Lilienthal (Baruch) Plan would have created an international agency to manage fissile material, contributed by the United States and the United Kingdom, the existing nuclear powers. This institutional arrangement (which was not, of course, adopted) resembled a trusteeship with the world community as beneficiary. It reflected the vital interests of donor states in preventing destabilizing proliferation, but the plan required a neutral trustee. The sponsors would not have been trusted to hold the material themselves.
Similarly, under the "common heritage" principle of UNCLOS III, the convention declares that rights to seabed resources are "vested in mankind as a whole, on whose behalf the Authority shall act." The powers of the Seabed Authority were limited to accord better with market principles and U.S. interests, but it retains its basic institutional structure, including important trustee characteristics that may evolve over time.
IO as allocator. A neutral party often allocates scarce resources among claimants to avoid paralyzing negotiating standoffs and lingering resentment: the parent, not the children, slices the birthday cake. IOs also serve this function.
The IAEA, for example, assists peaceful national nuclear programs. It necessarily evaluates proposed projects and allocates financial and personnel resources. Only a neutral body could be entrusted with such responsibility in a sensitive area. IFIs also allocate scarce resources according to project worthiness. The World Bank's charter tries to guarantee its neutrality by requiring that it ignore the political character of on behalf of the Western powers and punishes governments that pursue such as equity reduces its effectiveness. The World Bank defends its n presenting its policies as driven by technical analyses rather than value ju has retained a sufficient aura of neutrality to be entrusted with allocating the Global Environment Facility, the Ozone Trust Fund, and the climat convention.
IO as arbiter. According to Morgenthau (1967, 272) , "despite ... deficiencies [in] ... the legislative function [in international politics], a legal system might still be capable of holding in check the power aspirations of its subjects if there existed judicial agencies that could speak with authority whenever a dissension occurred with regard to the existence or the import of a legal rule." Few international institutions are truly designed to restrain state power, yet many help states resolve legal (and political) disputes. Neutrality is essential for such institutions, just as for a judge in the law merchant system (Milgrom, North, and Weingast 1990) , the European Court, or a domestic court.
Infacilitative intervention, an IO operates as "honest broker" to reduce transaction costs, improve information about preferences, transmit private offers, and overcome bargaining deadlocks. Chapter VI of the UN charter requires states to use traditional measures-including good offices, mediation, conciliation and fact finding-to resolve disputes that threaten international peace and security. The secretary-general frequently provides these services. The Human Rights Committee provides its good offices in interstate disputes and may appoint ad hoc conciliation commissions to propose possible settlements. Numerous international conventions, from the Antarctic to the NATO treaties, provide for similar measures if direct negotiations fail. Even the highly legalized WTO understanding on dispute settlement allows members to request mediation or conciliation by the director-general.
In binding intervention, international institutions issue legally binding decisions with the consent of all parties. The mere possibility of binding external intervention may bring recalcitrant states to the bargaining table and make negotiating positions more reasonable. The most common dispute resolution mechanism of this kind is arbitration. Participating states agree on arbitrators, procedures, and jurisdiction and agree to be bound by the arbitrators' decision. When agreement on these matters cannot be reached, other neutral IOs sometimes fill the gap-as when the Permanent Court of Arbitration selected the president of the U.S.-Iran claims tribunal. Arbitral tribunals resolve disputes on an ad hoc basis, as in the 1941 U.S.-Canada Trail Smelter arbitration, a leading precedent in international environmental law, or in the secretary-general's "Rainbow Warrior" arbitration between France and New Zealand. They also handle classes of disputes such as the famous Alabama Claims arbitration following the Civil War, the special claims commission for allied property claims following World War II, and the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal. The following comment on the Rainbow Warrior dispute applies to most of these cases: "This solution is not without critics in both countries.... However, ... the settlement proved much more acceptable-precisely because of its unimpeachable source-than would ha been the same, or any other, solution arrived at solely by the parties themselves. Neith government... could be accused by its internal critics of having yielded to the othe (Franck and Nolte 1993, 166) .
Many international agreements, from bilateral commercial treaties to the law of th sea convention, rely on arbitration through ad hoc panels or more permanent insti tions. The GATT-WTO dispute resolution process is similar to arbitration. In the interest of neutrality, the director-general maintains a roster of qualified panelis suggests panelists to disputants, and names the panel if the parties cannot agree NAFTA incorporates several arbitration procedures, including an innovative one whereby arbitrators review national antidumping and countervailing duty decisions ensure that national law was followed. The International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), affiliated with the World Bank, provides neutral facilities for arbitrations between private investors and host governments.
The principal international judicial authority is the International Court of Justice (ICJ). Unlike domestic courts, it must be granted jurisdiction by parties to a dispute. Most cases have arisen under treaties that include submission to ICJ jurisdiction. The ICJ also issues advisory opinions to UN organs and specialized agencies. The court has issued a number of decisions of significance but has not been heavily used by states; GATI panels, for instance, have issued many more decisions than the ICJ. A relatively small number of states have accepted compulsory jurisdiction, and efforts to use the court during high-profile disputes led France and the United States to terminate their acceptance, although not without cost. The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights (which also requires acceptance ofjurisdiction) have been more successful. Indeed, the former-whose judges are chosen "from persons whose independence is beyond doubt"-approaches the authority of the judicial institutions Morgenthau had in mind. Its judges have played a leading (independent) role in promoting European legal integration (Burley and Mattli 1993) . Other international institutions, including the WTO appellate body, may also develop into successful judicial agencies.
AS COMMUNITY
REPRESENTATIVE AND ENFORCER
In this section, we consider broader and more controversial functions of some of which go beyond a simple state-centric approach. We examin structure and use formal organizations to create and implement communit norms and to assist in the enforcement of international commitments.
demonstrates further how the study of IOs forces different theoret engage one another. We discuss these two functions separately, then toget examination of the role of the UN in the Gulf War-an example that al the significance of IOs in situations of violent conflict.
States establish IOs to act as a representative or embodiment of a comm states. This was a central aspiration in the postwar organizational boom an an important, if only partially fulfilled, aspect of IO operations today.
Community institutions take several forms. They may be inclusive bod the General Assembly, the town square of international politics, created as which common issues can be addressed. Within such institutions, states wo express their common interests and values. The process may be largely con when states consider some problem of common concern such as environmen or the behavior of a rogue state, or it may entail one set of states pressuring accept new principles such as human rights, the oceans as a commons, or Other community institutions, such as the Security Council, are representa These incorporate the major actors (as realism would predict) as wel representing other interests. These smaller bodies instantiate political bargain representation rules while providing a more efficient forum in which to issues, especially those requiring operational responses. Finally, communit tions such as the ICJ are structured to promote independence and neutral actions constrained by a charge to act in the common interest. All three advance community interests with special legitimacy.
The UN, established by the Allies when they had unchecked domin undoubtedly intended to serve their own purposes. It was also based on a c of shared interests and values that went well beyond laundering or even neut charter's broad goals presupposed a direct relation between national welfa tions around the globe, and the peaceful working of the international comm whole. The principal goal was to maintain international peace and securit organs were authorized to intervene-not just mediate-in interstate dispu threatened peace. Other goals were to develop friendly relations among st on the principles of equal rights and self-determination, to promote fun freedoms, and to promote cooperation on a wide range of global problem interests in many of these areas-human rights, democracy, and liberal e relations-are still developing.
Perhaps the most important function of community organizations is to dev express community norms and aspirations. Although the General Assembl Security Council's power of action, it can have substantial impact on int politics by expressing shared values on issues like human rights, apartheid zation, and environmental protection in ways that legitimate or delegiti conduct. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a striking example the declaration cannot be enforced, its explicit and sweeping formulation o has significantly affected state behavior. Its norms have been included i treaties, and the declaration itself has been incorporated into some nationa tions, thereby influencing the character and preferences of states and, th international system itself. Although smaller states have been disproportio to account on this issue, even large states like the former Soviet Union an nuclear states like South Africa have been affected.
Similarly, although GATT (unlike the WTO) was intentionally created with as few attributes of an independent IO as possible, its contracting parties and council have formulated important policies for the trading community, including "differential and more favorable treatment" for developing countries. Although contested, this principle has been reflected in subsequent trade negotiations and the generalized system of preferences.
Courts as independent institutions also formulate and express community policy. By enunciating, elaborating, and applying rules publicly, they educate the community and strengthen underlying norms (Abbott 1992) . A highly unusual IO, the UN tribunal dealing with war crimes in the former Yugoslavia, combines these public judicial roles with the closely related public role of prosecutor. But states have not fully embraced the community functions of courts. Even the ICJ is structured to minimize its community role: its jurisdiction rests on party consent, and its decisions have no formal status as precedents. Yet, ICJ decisions are regularly relied on, and the court has on important occasions acted as expositor of fundamental community values, as in the Iranian hostages case and, many would say, Nicaragua's suit against the United States. These decisions have important moral authority even when they cannot be enforced in the traditional sense. Similar functions are performed by the European and Inter-American Commissions and Courts of Human Rights, and even by quasi-judicial bodies like the ILO governing body.
The most controversial example of community representation is the Security Council's "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security."
The council is empowered to investigate any situation that might lead to international friction and recommend means of resolving the conflict, including terms of settlement. It is further empowered under Chapter VII to "take action" against any threat to peace. When using armed force, however, the council has proceeded much as with economic sanctions, calling on members to give effect to measures it has approved. An 10 with these powers could overcome free-rider problems hampering decentralized efforts to maintain peace. But the Security Council has the deeper rationale of representing the community. Because local disputes might spill over and disrupt the larger community, they affect the general welfare. Such disputes should not be dealt with exclusively by the parties themselves, or by third states intervening for their own private interests, but by collective bodies that consider the effects of the dispute and of external intervention on the general welfare. Chapter VIII of the charter even authorizes regional organizations like the Organization of American States (OAS) to deal with local disputes, although they only take "enforcement action" with council approval, lest such action itself threaten the peace of the larger community. Finally, situating private disputes in terms of community interests and institutions brings a heightened level of political and moral pressure to bear on disputants and potential intervenors.
The creation and development of IOs often represent deliberate decisions by states to change their mutually constituted environment and, thus, themselves. IOs can affect the interests and values of states in ways that cannot be fully anticipated. Yet, it is important to stress that these processes are initiated and shaped by states. Furthermore, IOs are constrained by institutional procedures-including financial contributions and leadership appointments-that are controlled by states and, ultimately, b of (some) states to withdraw, albeit at some cost. These possibilities and make IOs an important window into the relation between rationalist and con analysis.
IOs AS MANAGERS OF ENFORCEMENT
The role of IOs in ensuring compliance with international commitments be understood by integrating managerial and enforcement views of the Observing high levels of compliance with international agreements, even strong enforcement provisions are rarely included or used, the manager concludes that IR has focused too heavily on coercive enforcement. In th noncompliance typically results not from deliberate cheating but from amb agreements, insufficient state capacity, or changing international and domest stances (Chayes and Chayes 1995; see also Mitchell 1994; Young 1994) . Reso of such problems lies not in stronger enforcement but in better manage compliance. Downs, Rocke, and Barsoom (1996) counter that, without enfor states will cheat on agreements and that observed compliance levels large shallow agreements that require little change in state behavior. An overly sharp distinction between managerial and enforcement func misleading. For many significant day-to-day activities-especially ones inv coordination-incentives to defect are relatively small compared with the b cooperation; here, the managerial approach is sufficient. In other cases, som ment may be necessary, at least potentially. IOs support both kinds of activ important, the strictly decentralized models that underpin the enforcement v apply strictly to the richer environment of international politics, especially w are numerous and face significant informational problems. In these mor settings, IOs can manage enforcement activities to make them more effect limit their adverse side effects.
Many IO functions identified earlier are valuable in implementing the managerial approach. Ambiguity can be resolved through dispute resolution and other third-party procedures, including fact finding, good offices, interpretation of international agreements, and mediation. State incapacity is addressed directly by financial and technical assistance. Emerging compliance problems due to changing circumstances can be managed by IO political and judicial organs with authority to interpret and adapt agreements and elaborate norms.
When enforcement is needed, IOs can facilitate decentralized action. They increase the prospect of continued interaction, often across issues, and generalize reputational effects of reneging across members of the organization. Some IOs directly monitor state behavior, producing credible neutral information necessary for effective enforcement. IOs further provide forums in which suspicious actions can be explained, lowering the risk that misperceptions will upset cooperation, and in which pressure can be brought on transgressor states. In these ways, international legal discussions about "mobilization of shame" can be understood not in the moral sense of creating methods of direct enforcement, and, equally important, their limitation above, the original conception of Chapter VII involved independent act Security Council on behalf of the community of states, using military un "on its call" by member states and guided by a military staff committee. T enforcement except that the units to be deployed, even the members of th were to be provided by states. This distinguishes Chapter VII from, sa pendent ability of the IMF to cut off funds to a country that violates i commitments. Moreover, Chapter VII has never operated as originally int two principal episodes in which military force has been used-Korea and War-the council instead authorized national military actions, led in both United States. How are these episodes to be understood?
In the more cynical view, both are examples of dirty laundering. By Security Council approval, the United States cast essentially unilateral ac legitimate collective action. The same interpretation can be applied to enforcement actions against Castro's Cuba. Arguably, the organizations sufficiently independent of U.S. influence to convert the measures taken community action. In the Gulf War, these measures were transparently n council simply called on other states to cooperate with the United Stat was already operating in the Gulf theater, and coalition forces w dominated by the United States, whose troops even retained their own u commanders.
Yet, these episodes can also be seen in a more affirmative light. The institutional underpinnings essential to the original vision of Chapter VII had never been put in place: there were no agreements for the provision of national forces, no emergency units standing by, no military staff committee. Lacking appropriate institutional arrangements, the council carried out its community responsibilities in the only practicable way, by shifting from direct to indirect enforcement, lending its institutional authority to legitimate action by willing nations. Its membership structure and voting rules made the council sufficiently independent and representative to perform a genuine laundering function.13 The United States, after all, assiduously courted council approval (partly by moving more cautiously) for reasons of both domestic and international politics. The imprimatur of the council was essential to other participants:
Middle Eastern states, for example, needed it to justify cooperation with the coalition.
In this episode, just as Claude (1966, 74) put it more than 30 years ago, "proclamations of approval or disapproval by organs of the United Nations, deficient as they typically are in ... effective supportive power, are really important .... [S]tatesmen, by so obviously attaching importance to them, have made them important."14
The affirmative view sees the council, especially during the Gulf War, as representing the community of states. This representative status, not simply the formal procedures of Chapter VII, led the United States and other states to seek council action:
13. The current debate over the composition of the council reflects the idea that such an institution should be more representative of the community on behalf of which it acts.
14. See also Haas (1958) and, for a more skeptical view, see Slater (1969) .
Security Council resolutions on Iraq carried unique political weight because they came from the established community institution with primary responsibility for international peace and security. Resolutions condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as unlawful, declaring void the incorporation of Kuwaiti territory into Iraq, denouncing human rights and environmental abuses by Iraqi forces, authorizing member states to cooperate with U.S. forces, forcing the destruction of Iraqi weapons, and holding Iraq financially responsible for its actions are clear expressions of the shared moral and legal sense of organized international society. The 1O was the locus for giving meaning to state action. The United States, even as the clearly dominant power in coercive activity, had good reasons to act not simply from might but from persuasion.
Thus, realist, constructivist, and rational-regime arguments come together in consideration of the role of IOs in the Gulf crisis. Although some might prefer to find a singular "winner" among the three explanations, we believe each explains a significant part of the episode and that any unidimensional explanation would be incomplete. In any event, IOs provide an important laboratory in which to observe the operation of these different aspects of international politics.
CONCLUSION
For several decades, states have taken IOs more seriously than hav Whereas formal IOs have been seriously neglected in the theoretical study tional regimes, they have played a major role in many, if not most, in interstate collaboration. By taking advantage of the centralization and in of IOs, states are able to achieve goals that they cannot accomplish on a d basis. In some circumstances, the role of IOs extends even further to i development of common norms and practices that help define, or refi themselves. At the same time, because issues of power and distribution ar states are wary of allowing IOs too much autonomy. Thus, we do not cla are supplanting the states system. We do claim that IOs provide an impor ment to decentralized cooperation that affects the nature and perform international system. Scholars must take IOs more seriously if they are t interstate relations.
Although we have presented the case for the importance of formal ins international cooperation, the shortcomings of many actual organizations saying. In addition, in emphasizing the possibilities for formal organiz should not ignore the difficulty and even impossibility of some of the t presented to them. Despite these severe limitations, the fact that IOs ha abandoned by states is testimony to both their actual value and their per potential. A better theoretical and empirical understanding of formal or should help improve their performance.
